MISSION

To identify and analyze alternative national and international strategies and policies for meeting food needs of the developing world on a sustainable basis, with particular emphasis on low-income countries and on the poorer groups in those countries.
Research That Matters

The Impact of IFPRI’s Policy Research

With millions of dollars spent each year on policy research in developing countries, governments and donors want to know that their dollars improve the lives of the poor. But do they? Or do research findings and policy recommendations sink silently into vast bureaucracies?

To better understand how policy research has an impact on policy choices, and to gauge IFPRI’s own effectiveness, the Institute commissioned a series of in-depth case studies to look at how research findings are communicated to and used by policymakers. The case studies show that policy research can promote action that improves the lives of the poor. And they demonstrate that research often recovers its costs many times over in fiscal savings alone, without even considering more important improvements in poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition.

The case studies show that an organization like IFPRI can have impact in three main ways. First, IFPRI works with decisionmakers in a particular country to respond to their need for answers to a specific policy question, as in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Viet Nam. Given their interest in the findings, policymakers use the information almost immediately. Second, IFPRI works with researchers and policymakers in individual countries to strengthen analytical and decisionmaking capacity, as in Malawi. Capacity building is critical for ensuring that policymakers can fully understand and make use of research information.

Third, IFPRI pursues research to fill critical gaps in global understanding of agricultural, food, and nutrition issues. Broad-based research findings filter into national and international policy debates, changing policymakers’ thinking and influencing their actions. IFPRI’s work on food subsidies and its 2020 Vision Initiative on Food, Agriculture, and the
Environment are two examples of how IFPRI contributes to cutting-edge food policy research and how it produces knowledge with impacts far beyond a single country’s borders.

Viet Nam

Reaping the Benefits of a New Rice Marketing Policy

In 1998 IFPRI research on rice markets in Viet Nam led policymakers to take bold steps to relax quotas on rice exports and to liberalize internal restrictions on rice trading. These policy changes are already worth $61 million to Viet Nam, as rice farmers have taken advantage of international prices and the government has saved on program costs. The benefits could rise to $966 million if the changes are sustained to 2020. Gains to the rest of the world from lower international rice prices could be worth $560 million by 2020. With a research cost of only about $1 million, the benefit-cost ratio to Viet Nam alone already reaches 114. This rises to 187 if benefits to the rest of the world are included as well.

Interviews by an independent consultant with 35 officials and stakeholders in the research made clear that the IFPRI study provided new insights into the workings of Viet Nam’s rice sector and that the research helped make the government more receptive to the study’s recommendations. The clear finding was that the IFPRI research strongly influenced policy decisions to relax export quotas, involve the private sector in export marketing, and reduce internal trade restrictions.

IFPRI’s work was itself a milestone in the study of rice marketing in Viet Nam, for little research had previously been done in this area. The study, conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, provided new information even to those who knew the Vietnamese rice sector well. Based on the study’s findings on marketing, processing, and storage, IFPRI created an economic simulation model that policymakers used to explore the effects of decentralizing the marketing system, developing infrastructure, or changing pricing policy.
Why Research Made a Difference

One reason policymakers responded quickly to the new information was that the research addressed critical questions surrounding a pressing policy issue. Economic and social conditions had placed rice policy squarely on the government’s agenda. Rice production was flourishing, yet with no additional outlets, producer prices were falling. Farmers in the south had begun to protest, pushing the government to lift export quotas.

Government officials hesitated to act because they feared that allowing more exports would lead to higher domestic prices and thereby increase poverty. They were also concerned that the policy change might exacerbate political tensions if it affected regions or rural and urban areas differently. In response to these concerns, IFPRI and its national counterparts developed the model, which showed that removing the export quota would increase rice exports significantly, raise the national income, and reduce poverty. According to policymakers involved in the policy process, these findings sped up the decision to relax export quotas by many months, if not years.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development used these results to counter objections that raising export quotas would increase food insecurity. The Ministry of Finance pointed to data showing that state-owned enterprises were earning monopoly revenues from their control of exports. Greater involvement of the private sector, they contended, could improve market efficiency and lower prices. In sum, this research added confidence that raising export quotas would not result in undesirable or unanticipated consequences.

IFPRI also worked hard to make the information readily available to policymakers. Within the space of little more than a year, IFPRI held 19 seminars and workshops to disseminate the findings, and it delivered 23 reports, papers, and training manuals to key decisionmakers and stakeholders. These seminars helped policymakers from different ministries and with different perspectives arrive at a consensus for action: in these meetings they could comment on the research, exchange ideas, and get answers to their questions.
IFPRI’s collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development helped convert the research findings into action and helped the Ministry emerge as the most authoritative voice on agriculture in the country.

By 1998 the Vietnamese government had raised the export quota, lifted internal restrictions on rice marketing, and allowed the private sector to participate in rice marketing. These actions improved the incomes of poor, rural farmers and saved the country millions of dollars that could be put to other, more socially beneficial uses.

Bangladesh

Changing the Course of Food and Agricultural Policy

IFPRI’s 1989–94 collaboration with the Ministry of Food in Bangladesh made substantial contributions to food policy reforms there, as recognized by independent reviewers, the government of Bangladesh, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). As a result of this collaboration, the government radically altered some long-standing food programs, created some innovative new ones, and improved the capacity of staff to meet the informational and analytical needs of the ministry. A study of the comparative advantages of different crops guided the development of a new strategy aimed at diversifying agriculture. Studies of rice and wheat markets found that the government could turn grain procurement and sales over to the private sector without harming the food security of the poor. When the government opened the grain markets to private sector participation, it saved $37 million by lowering the official procurement price.

An IFPRI study of the rural food ration program uncovered poor management and substantial leakages. The government had long been aware that the ration program was not effectively reaching its intended beneficiaries—the rural poor—and the study put hard numbers to the government’s suspicions. By eliminating the program, the government
saved $60 million. Some of these savings were used to increase expenditures on other, better targeted food and nutrition programs, including the innovative Food-for-Education program. Later evaluations found that this program raised school attendance by about 30 percent. Besides these policy changes, the research resulted in other more effective programs and strategies and saved the government at least $100 million, many times the research cost of less than $5 million. Moreover, the collaboration increased the body of knowledge on food policy in Bangladesh and the number of people equipped to make use of it by producing more than 70 research reports and providing training in food policy analysis to over 200 individuals.

**Why Research Made a Difference**

Why was IFPRI research so influential? First, IFPRI worked closely with key decisionmakers to understand what information they needed and, once research results were in hand, to convey it to them quickly. In some instances, IFPRI was the sole source of critical pieces of information: only the IFPRI study, for example, had quantified the amount of leakage in the ration program. Second, policymakers tended to trust the information because they believed it was unbiased, and they looked to the study for objective recommendations. Because it was known for its objectivity and respected methodologies, IFPRI was entrusted to produce in-depth analyses that outlined the problem and gave policymakers concrete options for action.

Third, the research was available at the right time. In the case of the rural ration program, for example, Bangladesh was enjoying high levels of foodgrain production, and prices were falling at the time of the decision. With greater prosperity, ration cardholders were indifferent to the program, and some external agencies, such as the World Bank, were pushing for its abolishment. Although IFPRI’s research helped the government justify a decision that might have been made anyway, policymakers subsequently contended that without IFPRI’s research, the government certainly would have delayed any decision to abandon the program, thereby wasting millions of dollars.
Pakistan

Examining the Effectiveness of Subsidies

In collaboration with the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) and the Pakistan Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MINFA), IFPRI’s research and policy dialogue were instrumental in changing the direction of food and agricultural policies in Pakistan. From 1986 to 1994, this collaboration produced a large body of research—over 80 journal articles and research manuscripts—that policymakers drew on as they made policy decisions. Outside evaluators estimated that IFPRI’s research, from 1986 to 1991, resulted in over $200 million in savings to the government. The total cost of research for the entire period was only about $6 million.

IFPRI’s work on the wheat ration shop program provides an especially clear example of the changes Pakistan made in its food policies. In this program, poor consumers were able to buy subsidized wheat from special shops. By the 1980s the government was spending millions on a program that was, by most accounts, corrupt and ineffective. Policymakers wanted to know if the program helped the poor or not, and what the effects on the poor would be if the program were eliminated.

In a national survey, IFPRI-PIDE research showed that well over half the wheat never reached the target population. Only 19 percent of the population in cities and 5 percent of the population in rural areas, where most of the poor lived, even used the ration shops. The research put numbers to the program’s failure to reach the poor, a finding that was expected but until then had been based mostly on conjecture, anecdotes, and one small study. The research provided solid data to drive the final nail in the coffin of the ration shop system. The government abolished the wheat ration shops in 1987.

Why Research Made a Difference

In the case of Pakistan, the overall policy environment was ripe for change. At that time the government wanted to denationalize the
economy, and the World Bank and USAID were pressing in the same
direction. The arrival of a new special adviser to the prime minister
was a catalyst for action.

The adviser believed the ration shops were too costly, and he
wanted the ration shop issue resolved in short order. He was familiar
with IFPRI and focused the study on answering key questions that he
knew others could justifiably raise in opposition to any attempt to
eliminate the ration shops: Would the poor be hurt? Could reducing the
government’s role in wheat production and marketing cause chaos in
the wheat marketing system and lead to famine? Research findings
that the program had enormous leakages and made a minimal contribution to meeting the food needs of the poor strengthened the case for abolishing the shops, as did the finding that the private sector could reliably step in to manage wheat marketing.

IFPRI’s reputation for methodologically sound and objective re-
search enhanced the credibility of findings with policymakers, so they did
not hesitate to use it in their policy discussions. In addition, the research
appealed to policymakers because it effectively highlighted a specific
course of action based on a comprehensive analysis of the options.

As in Viet Nam, researchers helped to build consensus for action
by conveying information quickly and effectively to key policymakers
and other stakeholders, especially those in the prime minister’s office,
the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance, and USAID. Given the in-
terconnections among policymakers in Pakistan, the principal re-
search findings had probably reached most influential officials by the
time the final analysis was completed in late 1986.

Would the government have made the same decision without
the research? Certainly key political players within the govern-
ment, such as the special adviser, would have pushed hard for change, but even he recognized the importance of having objective research to support his position. Without research-based information, abolition of the ration shops probably would not have occurred or would have happened only with significant opposition and sub-
stantial delay.
FPRI’s work with the Malawian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development from the late 1980s to the early 1990s and with Bunda College, the country’s leading agricultural institution, since the mid-1990s has helped the country substantially increase its capacity to conduct food policy analysis.

Together the projects produced more than 40 papers and a working papers series. IFPRI was a major participant in more than 100 workshops and training courses with over 1,500 participants. The data collected under these projects were documented and left with collaborators, so that others, now trained or to be trained, can use them.

One of IFPRI’s initial activities in Malawi was to implement a system that monitors food security and nutrition. This collaboration had an impact that reverberated throughout the government as officials came to see the importance of having timely, credible information for decisionmaking. Although the Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program had originally set up the system, responsibility for the project shifted when key personnel on the project came to IFPRI.

The drought of 1991-92 raised the specter of widespread famine, as maize production fell by 60 percent. Yet data from the food security and nutrition monitoring system kept government officials informed about the agricultural, food, and nutritional situation with only a short time lag. The data helped the government to rapidly identify needy areas, estimate food needs and import requirements, and plan relief distribution more efficiently. With timely and relevant information, the government was able to move quickly to mitigate the effects of the drought, avoid widespread famine, and save lives. This experience, bolstered at key moments by support from UNICEF, created an awareness within the government of the need for community-based food security and monitoring systems in Malawi.
Just as important, the project built analytical and decisionmaking capacity in Malawi. The Ministries of Agriculture, of Health, and of Women, Youth, and Community now conduct their own household surveys or have established data collection activities following the approach used by IFPRI. Close to half of those originally trained in data collection remained in the National Statistics Office (until transferred recently to the Ministry of Agriculture), undertaking similar activities for various ministries and NGOs.

At Bunda College, IFPRI helped to design and implement a master’s degree program in agricultural economics and an executive education program in agricultural policy analysis. Sixteen master’s degrees in agricultural economics were awarded. IFPRI initially developed the curriculum, taught courses, and supervised students in both the master’s program and the executive training courses. But IFPRI worked quickly to build capacity within the country so that Malawians could take over the programs. Malawi faculty are now fully responsible for teaching and thesis supervision in the master’s program, and Malawian institutions are responsible for 90 percent of the teaching in the policy training course.

Graduates from both programs are now found throughout the public and private sectors, bringing additional expertise to their jobs as a result of their training. Ministry of Agriculture staff consistently confirmed to an outside evaluator that they found the courses useful for their work. The high demand for Bunda College graduates and the salary premium they demand attest to the value that Malawian organizations place on the training. The training also had spillover effects, putting graduates into decisionmaking positions where they would have additional opportunities for training.

**Why Research and Training Made a Difference**

In interviews with over 30 Malawians familiar with the project, an independent evaluator found that almost all highly valued IFPRI’s contributions to capacity building in Malawi. IFPRI’s impact came about as a result of a number of factors. UNICEF’s persistent call for
greater attention to the problems of food insecurity and malnutrition in the 1980s helped to create a receptive environment in which the government sought research to inform policy choices. IFPRI’s team of researchers quickly cemented a reputation for rigorous but timely data collection, analysis, and policy formulation.

**Food Subsidies in Developing Countries**

*Building a Broad Program of Research*

A research institute can also have impact by influencing how the broader development community thinks. IFPRI’s comprehensive program of research on food subsidies illustrates how communication of results from a series of specific projects can translate into shared knowledge and have a global impact on policies.

In Asia, IFPRI has done research on subsidies in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Egypt, the Sudan, and Zambia represent experience in Africa, while in Latin America IFPRI worked on subsidies in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Some persistent findings emerge from the research: Broad subsidies can be of considerable benefit to the poor, but the cost of such benefits is generally high. Subsidies are often targeted more to cities than to rural areas, even though most of the poor usually live in the countryside. The nonpoor often manage to get a substantial portion of the subsidy. In the end, though, recognizing the potential benefits of subsidies, IFPRI’s work has tended to focus not on how to eliminate subsidies but on ways to improve their targeting and cost-effectiveness.

IFPRI has undertaken two major projects in Egypt. In the first project, which occurred in the mid-1980s, policymakers used the research to project the likely effects of policy changes on macroeconomic indicators, income distribution, and food consumption. IFPRI returned to Egypt in the mid-1990s to work with the government on a comprehensive study of the food subsidy system, with the result that the government decided to use a new method of targeting subsidies.
In the Philippines IFPRI studied a pilot project targeting food subsidies to poor households with malnourished children. The findings from the study were used not only in the Philippines, but also in Mexico in programs to improve child nutrition.

Generating Global Knowledge

Developing-country policymakers are not the only ones who have relied on IFPRI’s research in these areas. Development practitioners and academic experts, too, have recognized the scope and quality of IFPRI’s research on food subsidies. There is ample evidence that it has reached and influenced the global community of researchers and concerned policymakers. In a comprehensive review of health and nutrition by Jere Behrman and Anil B. Deolalikar in the 1988 Handbook of Development Economics, five of the six studies mentioned on the nutritional impact of subsidies are from IFPRI.

IFPRI brought together its work on consumer food subsidies in the 1988 book Food Subsidies in Developing Countries: Costs, Benefits and Policy Options, edited by Per Pinstrup-Andersen. This carefully planned and crafted work was not primarily written for social scientists—there are no equations or extended discussions of methodology—but for the general reader, particularly the decisionmaker in developing countries and aid agencies.

Reviewers of the book recognized these qualities. For example, Simon Maxwell, then at the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, wrote:

...a consistent set of messages has emerged [from the extensive IFPRI research on food subsidies]: in favor of consumer subsidies to provide income support to the poorest groups; against generalized price subsidies which discriminate against producers and may entail large fiscal costs; and in favor of targeted programs, especially those which avoid large administrative costs through self-targeting or geographical limitations. Taken together these messages make up the conventional wisdom on subsidies; their influence can be seen
in, for example, the 1986 World Bank policy study, Poverty and Hunger.

A 1989 review in the Food and Nutrition Bulletin concurred, saying, “This book is by far the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment of food subsidies available.”

In sum, academics and policymakers have acknowledged the leading role that IFPRI’s work on subsidies has had in providing guidelines for subsidy policies around the world. Although the work was undertaken in collaboration with developing-country partners and guided subsidy policy changes in those countries, IFPRI’s work on subsidies has also been an essential reference for policymakers and development practitioners outside study countries as they make their own decisions on subsidy policies.

The 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Initiative

Keeping Food and Agriculture on the Policy Agenda

Although it can be difficult to assess the cumulative effect of research on the actions of the broad development community, an independent review of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment initiative reports that the initiative has had substantial impacts on researchers, educators, and global policy leaders in both developed and developing countries. The initiative, which provides highly accessible, research-based information to government officials and development professionals, has made a significant contribution to the knowledge base that decisionmakers around the world use to guide program and policy choices. The initiative helps keep food and agricultural issues in developing countries on the agenda for donors and governments, and yet costs less than $1 million a year.

In the early 1990s, international support for agricultural research was in decline and governments were turning their attention away from agriculture and rural development. In 1993, concerned that
future food needs might go unmet, IFPRI launched the 2020 Vision initiative to refocus attention on agricultural development and to stimulate debate on critical world food issues. The initiative focuses on three main audiences: researchers and educators; policy leaders in developed countries, including the donor community, international nongovernmental organizations, and international financial institutions; and decisionmakers in developing countries.

An initial phase aimed primarily at reaching the first two groups with information, while a second phase, which is just beginning, will help to create and sustain regionally based networks so that developing-country researchers and policymakers can lead their own country-specific “visioning” processes. To date, IFPRI has held more than 90 meetings in over 40 countries to consult with and convey findings to these audiences. The initiative has sent out more than 400,000 publications, half of these to the developing world. In a readership survey, 98 percent of those who responded found them useful.

**Catalyzing Consensus and Stimulating Action**

A recent independent review of the initiative found that the 2020 Vision initiative has had a highly significant impact in terms of reaching all three audiences with 2020 materials. The three communities have become highly aware of the findings of the initiative through the numerous 2020 publications and meetings.

The review also concludes that the 2020 Vision initiative has gone beyond merely reaching these audiences and has helped to catalyze a consensus for action among governments, donors, and other institutions outside and within the developing world. For example, as part of the initiative, IFPRI developed an economic model of world food supply and demand. This economic model, now routinely included in discussions about world food projections by key international players such as USAID, has helped make IFPRI one of the top sources of information in the public debate on world food prospects.

Other organizations use the many topical briefs, working papers, and regional action syntheses prepared by the 2020 Vision initiative to
lobby for action, help draft legislation, or prepare internal program strategy documents. These associations include multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank; development agencies, including the United Nations World Food Programme and the Japan International Cooperation Agency; and nongovernmental organizations and research and advocacy organizations, such as the World Resources Institute, Bread for the World, and World Vision.

Through its initial consultations with regional experts from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the initiative helped build consensus for action in developing countries themselves. Analyses and recommendations were developed by experts from each region for that particular area, published as a synthesis document, and widely distributed. The African Development Bank redirected funds to and within agriculture as a result of the recommended strategy. In Asia, the Minister of Agriculture of Nepal used 2020 materials to develop the national agricultural plan. In Latin America the Inter-American Development Bank supported four regional workshops to promote country-level action.

The review also finds that the 2020 Vision initiative has had success in helping to turn a consensus for action into real action by the international community. Information from 2020 has effectively changed minds and even affected organizational strategies and budgets. For example, one of the most consistent messages to emerge from the 2020 initiative is the need to increase funding for international agricultural research. In Australia, AusAID used 2020 materials to support its own national effort to increase funding for agriculture. The budget for international agriculture research there almost quadrupled from 1993 to 1998. In Denmark, Danida staff also used 2020 materials to urge increases in spending on agricultural development. Between 1995 and 1998, bilateral spending on agricultural development more than doubled from 1994 levels.
Determining how policy research affects policy choices is not easy. Research is only one source of information reaching policymakers. Many groups, including advocacy organizations and the media, bombard the decisionmaker with different points of view. In addition, policymakers invariably take politics, not just data, into account when they make their decisions. Nonetheless, IFPRI’s experience shows that it is possible to discern links between research and policy actions. While IFPRI was not the sole influence on the policy changes described here, research conducted by IFPRI and its developing-country partners was clearly a key element in the decision-making process.

The concrete results of policy research can be difficult to see and may take time to emerge. Nonetheless, better information has the great potential to lead to better, more effective action, not only saving money, but also, more importantly, saving and improving lives.
## Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Policy question</th>
<th>IFPRI research findings or activities</th>
<th>Policy decisions</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>How can the government make its food programs more efficient?</td>
<td>• Rural food ration program suffers from inefficient management and “leakages” of food to better-off households.</td>
<td>• Design better-targeted programs, such as Food-for-Education.</td>
<td>• Improve food and nutrition security through programs better targeted to the poor.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Eliminate rural ration program.</td>
<td>• Save government $60 million on ineffective program.</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>How can Malawi increase its capacity to conduct food policy analysis?</td>
<td>• Improve information available to policymakers.</td>
<td>• Implement a food and nutrition monitoring system.</td>
<td>• Improve government response to famine and food and agricultural crises.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide staff with additional education and training.</td>
<td>• Establish master’s degree program and executive training programs at Bunda College.</td>
<td>• Increase analytical and decisionmaking capacity in government and at university.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Can the government reduce expenditures on wheat ration shops without hurting the poor?</td>
<td>• Not many poor use the ration shops.</td>
<td>• Eliminate wheat ration shops.</td>
<td>• Save millions on program costs without increasing poverty or food insecurity.</td>
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<td>• Significant amounts of food go to better-off households.</td>
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<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Should rice marketing policies be changed?</td>
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<td>• Higher exports would increase demand for Vietnamese rice.</td>
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<td>• More rice exports will raise national income without increasing hunger or poverty.</td>
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<td>• Private sector involvement in rice marketing will improve market efficiency.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Raise rice export quotas.</td>
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<td>• Lift internal restrictions on rice trade.</td>
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<td>• Involve private sector more in marketing.</td>
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<td>• Viet Nam’s national income increases by at least $60 million.</td>
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<td>• Rice consumers outside Viet Nam gain from lower international rice prices.</td>
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<th>Multiple</th>
<th>What are the costs and benefits of food subsidies? How can food subsidies be better targeted?</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Broad subsidies can benefit the poor but costs are high.</td>
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<td>• Subsidies are targeted to urban areas, rather than the often-needier rural ones.</td>
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<td>• Better-off households often get a large proportion of the subsidy.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Development practitioners and government officials use IFPRI’s research to design and implement food subsidy programs around the world.</td>
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<td>• Better-targeted subsidy programs are better at reaching the poor and more cost-effective.</td>
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<th>Global</th>
<th>How should governments and development agencies help ensure that future world food demand is met?</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governments and development agencies should act to increase spending on agricultural research.</td>
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<td>• Governments increase funds for agricultural research.</td>
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<td>• Multilateral institutions redirect funds to agriculture.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Governments and development agencies are more aware of the importance of dedicating resources to agricultural research to meet future food needs in a sustainable way.</td>
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Case Studies


Text:
James Garrett, Research Fellow, IFPRI.

Cover photos:
Claudia Ringler (top);
Philippe Berry (bottom).
VIET NAM
Consensus for Action in Rice Markets

BANGLADESH
Diversifying Agriculture

PAKISTAN
New Directions for Agricultural Policy

MALAWI
Improving Research and Policy Capacity

FOOD SUBSIDIES
Improving Cost-Effectiveness

2020 VISION
Keeping Food on the Policy Agenda